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POSTEMPLOYMENT NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS: WHY UTAH 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A noncompete agreement is “[a] promise, usu[ally] in a sale-of-business, 
partnership, or employment contract, not to engage in the same type of business for 
a stated time in the same market as the buyer, partner, or employer.” 1  More 
specifically, postemployment noncompete agreements restrict employees from 
working within a particular field or industry for a specified period of time after 
leaving a company.2 Employers most commonly negotiate noncompete agreements 
with their “technical, sales, and managerial personnel who have access to 
confidential business information or develop close relationships with customers.”3  
Employers who use noncompete agreements claim they are “perhaps the only 
effective method of preventing unscrupulous competitors or employees from 
appropriating valuable trade information and customer relationships for their own 
benefit.”4 Employers further assert that “[w]ithout the protection afforded by such 
covenants, it is argued, businessmen could not afford to stimulate research and 
improvement of business methods to a desirably high level, nor could they achieve 
the degree of freedom of communication within a company that is necessary for 
efficient operation.”5 
Forty-six states permit postemployment noncompete agreements. 6  Utah is 
included in this majority, while California, representing the minority, bans 
postemployment agreements.7  
This Note proposes that the Utah Legislature pass legislation mirroring 
California’s statutory law on postemployment noncompete agreements for the 
                                                 
* © 2015 Christopher Mack. J.D. Candidate 2016, S.J. Quinney College of Law, 
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1 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1215 (10th ed. 2014). 
2 Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626 
(1960). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 627. 
5 Id. 
6 See RUSSELL BECK, BECK REED RIDEN LLP, EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETES: A STATE BY 
STATE SURVEY 1–14 (2013), available at http://www.beckreedriden.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Noncompetes-50-State-Survey-Chart-20130814.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/C265-5PZE. 
7 Id. at 2, 12. 
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following reasons: (1) a ban of postemployment noncompete agreements would 
strengthen Utah’s economy and foster more ingenuity and innovation; (2) other legal 
mechanisms are more effective at achieving employers’ purported reasons for 
requiring their employees to agree to postemployment noncompete agreements; (3) 
noncompete agreements, even if unenforceable, deter the less sophisticated party—
the employee—from rightfully pursuing many employment opportunities; and (4) 
employees’ rights and interests should come before the interests of business entities.8 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II provides an overview of 
noncompetition law in both Utah and California. Part III discusses the policy 
arguments that underlie this Note’s recommendation that the Utah Legislature enact 
noncompetition laws that mirror those of California. Finally, Part IV concludes. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Noncompetition Law in Utah 
 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that postemployment noncompete 
agreements “are enforceable as long as they are supported by consideration, 
negotiated in good faith, necessary to protect a company’s goodwill, and reasonably 
limited in time and geographic area.”9 This section will examine each of the four 
elements of an enforceable noncompete agreement: (1) consideration, (2) good faith 
negotiations, (3) goodwill and trade secrets, and (4) limits on time and geographic 
area. 
 
1.  Consideration 
 
In Utah, noncompete agreements require consideration, 10  as do all valid 
contracts; however, the amount of consideration needed to enforce the agreement is 
                                                 
8 This proposal should not be viewed as a lofty goal but rather a reasonable possibility, 
as several states have already banned noncompete agreements, which have been a source of 
controversy for some time now, and some states have already banned noncompete 
agreements for entire industries on public policy grounds. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 5.6(a) (2013) (“A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: (a) a 
partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that 
restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an 
agreement concerning benefits upon retirement . . . .”); Kenneth R. Swift, Void Agreements, 
Knocked-Out Terms, and Blue Pencils: Judicial and Legislative Handling of Unreasonable 
Terms in Noncompete Agreements, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 223, 244 (2007) (“Some 
statutes specifically preclude noncompete agreements for certain occupations, such as 
physician or broadcast industry employees.” (citation omitted)). 
9 TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros., 199 P.3d 929, 932 (Utah 2008) (citing Allen v. Rose 
Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 828 (Utah 1951)). 
10 “Consideration is an act or promise bargained for and given in exchange for a 
promise.” Estate of Beesley v. Harris, 883 P.2d 1343, 1351 (Utah 1994) (citing Res. Mgmt. 
Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985)). 
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minimal. 11  In other words, there must be a bargained-for exchange, however 
nominal it may be. For example, courts generally view an offer of continued 
employment as valid consideration in postemployment noncompete agreements.12 
 
2.  Good-faith Negotiations 
 
As is true with all contract negotiations, courts require noncompete agreements 
to be negotiated in good faith.13 As such, Utah courts would likely deem ploys like 
“deception, intimidation, or any manner of coercion” as bad-faith negotiation tactics, 
and refuse to enforce contracts made in this manner.14 This might occur when an 
employer induces an employee to enter a noncompete agreement with the intent to 
promptly terminate the employee.15  
 
3.  Goodwill and Trade Secrets 
 
Utah courts define “goodwill” as:  
 
the advantage or benefit which is acquired by an establishment, beyond 
the mere value of the capital, stocks, funds or property employed therein, 
in consequence of the general patronage and encouragement which it 
receives from constant or habitual customers on account of its location, or 
local position or reputation for quality, skill, integrity or punctuality.16  
 
Utah Courts hold that postemployment noncompete agreements are necessary to 
protect a company’s goodwill where it can be shown an employee would likely lure 
away her employer’s customers or clients if she were allowed to compete nearby.17 
To be clear, to prevail on an injunction, the employer does not need to show the 
employee has taken, or will take, goodwill or trade secrets.18 Rather, the employer 
                                                 
11  See William R. Knowlton, Implementing Noncompete Agreements in Utah: 
Protecting Business Trade Secrets, Goodwill, and Investment in Employees, UTAH B.J., 
May/June 2014, at 16, 16. 
12 See Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983). 
13 See TruGreen Cos., 199 P.3d at 932. 
14 See Knowlton, supra note 11, at 16. 
15  See Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 828 (Utah 1951) (Wade, J., 
dissenting). 
16  Jackson v. Caldwell, 415 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1966). Black’s Law Dictionary 
provides an alternate definition for “goodwill”: “A business’s reputation, patronage, and 
other intangible assets that are considered when appraising the business, esp[ecially] for 
purchase; the ability to earn income in excess of the income that would be expected from the 
business viewed as a mere collection of assets.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, 
at 810. 
17 See Allen, 237 P.2d at 827. 
18 See Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1983). 
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must show there is a threat the former employee may take goodwill or trade secrets.19 
When seeking injunctive relief, the employer must also show the employee’s 
services were “special, unique, or extraordinary.”20 Similarly, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that noncompete agreements will be upheld where they are necessary 
to protect trade secrets.21 
 
4.  Limits on Time and Geographic Area 
 
Finally, the last prong of the test is whether the noncompete agreement is 
“reasonably limited in time and geographic area.”22 “The reasonableness of the 
restraints in a restrictive covenant is determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into 
account the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case and the subject 
covenant.”23 
Regarding the time element, the reasonableness standard has been stretched to 
its limits.24 As proof, Utah courts have upheld noncompete agreements with time 
restrictions ranging from one year all the way to twenty-five years.25 In general, 
however, time restrictions ranging from six months to two years are most likely to 
be considered reasonable.26 
Determining whether a geographic limitation is reasonable is highly fact 
specific.27 “Of primary importance . . . are the location and nature of the employer’s 
clientele.”28 The more prevalent and scattered the client base, the more stringent the 
geographic limitation may be.29 
 
(a)  Noncompete Cases in Utah 
 
The Utah Supreme Court has decided several cases shaping the landscape of 
noncompete law in the state. A summary of Utah’s seminal cases on 
postemployment noncompete agreements follows. 
 
                                                 
19 Id. 
20 Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1982). 
21  Allen, 237 P.2d at 827–28; but see Robbins, 645 P.2d at 628 (holding that an 
employee’s general knowledge or expertise developed through the course of her employment 
cannot be treated as a trade secret).  
22 TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros., 199 P.3d 929, 932 (Utah 2008) (citing Allen v. Rose 
Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 828 (Utah 1951)). 
23 Sys. Concepts, Inc., 669 P.2d at 427. 
24 See Knowlton, supra note 11, at 18. 
25  Id. (citing Robbins, 645 P.2d at 624 (one-year restriction); Valley Mortuary v. 
Fairbanks, 225 P.2d 739, 741 (Utah 1950) (twenty-five-year restriction)). 
26 Id. 
27 See Sys. Concepts, Inc., 669 P.2d at 427. 
28 Id. 
29 See Blake, supra note 2, at 662–63, 680. 
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(i)  Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy30 
 
Upon being hired by a new pharmacy, Mr. Allen agreed that if terminated, he 
would not compete within two miles of his employer for five years.31 After less than 
one year of employment, the pharmacy terminated Mr. Allen.32 Mr. Allen brought 
suit against the pharmacy seeking a declaration that the covenant was 
unenforceable.33 The trial court agreed and found that the covenant not to compete 
was unenforceable because it lacked consideration and the two-mile restriction was 
unreasonable.34 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s determination, 
holding the covenant not to compete enforceable and necessary to protect the 
pharmacy’s goodwill.35 The court reasoned that the pharmacy’s promise to employ 
and compensate Mr. Allen in exchange for Mr. Allen’s promise not to compete with 
the pharmacy was sufficient consideration.36 Next, the court found that the two-mile 
radius “seem[ed] reasonably calculated to protect the [pharmacy] from competition 
by [Mr. Allen] in view of the normal shopping habits of the public.”37 The court 
acknowledged that the term of five years was questionable, but in the end, it 
reasoned that because there was consideration and the restricted area was modest, 
the five-year term was not so overreaching as to cause the entire covenant to fail.38 
In his dissent, Justice Wade opined that the noncompete provision should have 
been deemed unenforceable because Mr. Allen was unfairly treated and the 
pharmacy took advantage of him.39  
 
(ii)  System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon40 
 
In May 1978, System Concepts, Inc. (“SCI”), a cable television equipment 
manufacturer, hired Ms. Dixon as a sales coordinator.41 In November of 1978, SCI 
asked Ms. Dixon to sign a noncompete agreement that restricted competition with 
any of SCI’s competitors for two years after her employment ended without any 
specific spatial restriction.42 Just prior to Ms. Dixon’s execution of the noncompete 
agreement, SCI promoted her as the national sales manager.43 In March 1981, Ms. 
                                                 
30 237 P.2d 823 (Utah 1951) 
31 Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 824 (Utah 1951). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 828. 
36 Id. at 825–26. 
37 Id. at 828. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 828 (Wade, J., dissenting). 
40 669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983) 
41 Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1983). 
42 See id. 
43 Id. 
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Dixon left SCI to accept a position with MetroData, a competitor of SCI, as its 
national sales manager.44 According to the court, at the time, the cable television 
equipment industry was in its infant stages, and as such, Ms. Dixon pursued the same 
customers as she had while at SCI.45 
After learning about Ms. Dixon’s employment with MetroData, SCI brought 
suit seeking a preliminary injunction and damages.46 The trial court denied the 
preliminary injunction, and SCI brought an interlocutory appeal.47 Ultimately, the 
Utah Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court and reversed and remanded the 
case with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction. 48  The court held that 
injunctive relief was justified because SCI showed its goodwill was vulnerable to 
the taking and Ms. Dixon’s services were “special, unique, or extraordinary.”49  
In its analysis, the Utah Supreme Court first noted the trial court found that the 
consideration element had been met because an offer of continued employment 
qualifies as adequate consideration.50 Second, the court noted there was no evidence, 
or even allegation, of bad-faith negotiations.51 Third, the court found that the two-
year restriction was reasonable.52 Finally, the court found that the spatial restriction 
was reasonable, despite the agreement’s failure to state a specific restrictive area.53 
While it appears that this particular point was an issue of first impression for Utah 
courts, the court cited and declined to follow persuasive precedent to the contrary, 
which holds that noncompete agreements are necessarily void where the employer 
fails to include a specific spatial restriction.54  
The court justified its position by noting that “[i]n those cases which have held 
a restrictive covenant void for failure to include a specific territorial restriction, 
generally the employer’s business and the potential scope of its clientele have been 
of a ‘local’ nature.”55 However, “[t]he business being protected in this case (cable 
television) is not one which is sought locally by a localized clientele.”56 
  
                                                 
44 Id. 
45 Id. According to the court, at that time, the cable television industry spanned the 
entire United States with an estimated 2,500 potential clients. Id. at 424 n.2. 
46 Id. at 424. 
47 Id. at 425. 
48 Id. at 429–30. 
49 See id. at 426. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 426–27. 
53 Id. at 427. 
54 See id. (citing H & R Block, Inc. v. Lovelace, 493 P.2d 205, 213 (Kan. 1972); 
Armstrong v. Taco Time Int’l, Inc., 635 P.2d 1114, 1117–18 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981); Pancake 
Realty Co. v. Harber, 73 S.E.2d 438, 443 (W. Va. 1952)). 
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
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B.  Noncompetition Law in California 
 
For decades California laws have banned postemployment noncompete 
agreements. In 1941, the California Legislature adopted the Business and 
Professions Code Section 16600 (“Section 16600”), placing a ban on 
postemployment noncompete agreements. 57  The California Legislature enacted 
Section 16600 in part “to protect the interests in free competition and employee 
mobility of all Californians, including consumers, competitors, and employees.”58 
A second important purpose motivated the enactment of Section 16600—creating 
and maintaining a healthy economy.59 Additionally, “[t]he Legislature’s statutory 
scheme was intended to eliminate post-employment restraints on competition and 
prevent litigation based on covenants not to compete.”60 
Section 16600 states, “[e]xcept as provided in this chapter, every contract by 
which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business 
of any kind is to that extent void.”61 The only exceptions to Section 16600’s ban on 
noncompete covenants are contracts dealing with the sale of a business and the 
dissolution of a partnership or limited liability company.62 
In responding to various challenges to Section 16600’s scope and validity, 
California state courts have consistently confirmed that “[t]he interests of the 
employee in his own mobility and betterment are deemed paramount to the 
competitive business interests of the employers . . . .”63 Furthermore, Section 16600 
                                                 
57 See Todd M. Malynn, The End of Judicially Created Restraints on Competition, 
COMPETITION, Spring 2009, at 35, 41. Section 16600’s predecessor was Civil Code Section 
1673, which was enacted in 1872 and was substantially similar. Id. at 39.  
58 Id. at 38. 
59 See id. at 42 (“Like the Cartwright Act, Section 16600 rests ‘on the premise that the 
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic 
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress . . . .’” 
(quoting Cianci v. Superior Court, 710 P.2d 375, 383 (Cal. 1985)). 
60 Id. at 38. 
61 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008). 
62 See Malynn, supra note 57, at 41. 
63 Application Grp., Inc. v. Hunter Grp., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998) (quoting Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)). Over the 
1980s and 1990s, beginning with Campbell v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford 
Junior University, 817 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1987), and concluding with International Business 
Machines Corp. v. Bajorek, 191 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit chipped away 
at Section 16600, creating a “narrow restraint” exception to the ban of noncompete 
agreements. See Malynn, supra note 57, at 45–46. The “narrow restraint” exception 
invalidated noncompete agreements only if the former employee could show that the 
covenant “‘completely restrained’ him from pursuing his profession.” Int’l Bus. Machs. 
Corp., 191 F.3d at 1040 (citing Gen. Commercial Packaging, Inc. v. TPS Package Eng’g, 
Inc., 126. F.3d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)). In 2008, the California Supreme 
Court issued a landmark decision, in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 
2008), eliminating the “narrow restraint” exception and “strongly reaffirm[ing] Section 
1208 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
“broadly protects ‘one of the most cherished commercial rights we possess’—‘the 
important legal right of persons to engage in businesses and occupations of their 
choosing.’”64 The result is that Section 16600 benefits all Californians because it 
“promotes an efficient labor market,” thereby utilizing human resources in the most 
effective way possible.65 This occurs because employers are on equal footing in 
competing for top talent.66 
Because the California Legislature has created a bright-line rule, it is easy to 
determine whether a contract is void due to a noncompete clause; “[a] contract is 
void if, by enforcing it, the employee ‘is not as free to [engage in a competing 
business] as he would have been if he were not bound by it.’”67  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Utah Legislature should follow California’s Legislature and ban all 
postemployment noncompete agreements for four reasons. First, a ban on 
postemployment noncompete agreements would enhance Utah’s economy and 
business sector. Second, there are other legal mechanisms employers could use to 
guard trade secrets and customers that do not require former employees to sacrifice 
their ability to work in their desired fields and areas. Third, a ban on postemployment 
noncompete agreements will help prevent employers from taking advantage of 
unsophisticated employees through the threat of unenforceable noncompete 
agreements. Finally, the rights and interests of employees should come before those 
of business entities. 
 
A.  A Ban on Postemployment Noncompete Agreements Would Strengthen Utah’s 
Economy and Business Sector 
 
Placing a ban on postemployment noncompete agreements would strengthen 
Utah’s economy and increase innovation and ingenuity. California’s ban on 
postemployment noncompete agreements validates this position. California has 
prohibited postemployment noncompete agreements dating back to 1872 when 
                                                 
16600’s sweeping prohibition against post-employment restraints on competition.” Malynn, 
supra note 57, at 54. Specifically, the court held that “[n]oncompetition agreements are 
invalid under Section 16600 in California even if narrowly drawn, unless they fall within the 
applicable statutory exceptions of sections 16601, 16602, or 16602.5.” Edwards, 189 P.3d at 
297. 
64 Malynn, supra note 57, at 39 (quoting Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 
734 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)). The California Legislature and state courts have made it a point 
to zealously guard and protect this right. See New Method Laundry Co. v. MacCann, 161 P. 
990, 991 (Cal. 1916).  
65 Malynn, supra note 57, at 42. 
66 See id. (citing Application Grp., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85). 
67  Malynn, supra note 57, at 44 (alteration in original) (quoting Chamberlain v. 
Augustine, 156 P. 479, 480 (Cal. 1916)). 
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Section 16600’s predecessor, Civil Code Section 1673, was enacted.68 Simply put, 
California’s ban on postemployment noncompete agreements has stood the test of 
time for over 140 years.69 Additionally, the ban has played an integral role in the 
growth of California’s business sector, especially Silicon Valley, California’s 
technology hub.70 Supporting this position, Professor Ronald J. Gilson (“Professor 
Gilson”), Professor of Law and Business at both Stanford Law School and Columbia 
University School of Law has  
 
attribute[d] the unparalleled success of California’s economy, particularly 
its high-technology industries, to the legal infrastructure created by 
Section 16600’s flat prohibition against post-employment restraints on 
competition, which enables labor resources to freely flow to their highest 
and best use, rewards innovation, and allows new businesses to grow, 
flourish, and mutually benefit from innovative ideas. He notes, however, 
that in the absence of a prohibition against post-employment restraints on 
competition, this extraordinary success would not be realized . . . .71 
 
According to Professor Gilson, there should not be any exceptions to the ban 
of postemployment noncompete agreements—not even for trade secrets.72 Although 
a noncompete agreement is a great way to protect a business’s trade secrets, it does 
more harm than good.73 “[C]ovenants not to compete are effective in the same sense 
that burning down a house to eliminate termites is effective: the problem is 
eliminated but the collateral damage from the solution is worse than the problem 
itself.”74 
Professor Gilson’s position is further supported by a recent Harvard Business 
School study documenting the amount of technology innovation in Michigan before 
1985, when there was a ban on postemployment noncompete agreements, and post-
1985 when the legislature lifted the ban.75 After the ban was lifted, there was a 
                                                 
68 See Malynn, supra note 57, at 39. 
69 See id. 
70 Id. at 43. Silicon Valley was the birthing ground for many of the world’s largest 
companies, including Google, Apple, Hewlett-Packard, Yahoo!, eBay, Cisco Systems, Intel, 
Adobe Systems, Oracle, Netflix, and many more. See Daniel J. Willis & Jack Davis, SV 150: 
Searchable Database of Silicon Valley’s Top 150 Companies for 2014, SILICON VALLEY 
(Apr. 14, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.siliconvalley.com/sv150/ci_25548370, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7FZ5-MHRT. 
71 Malynn, supra note 57, at 43 (citing Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of 
High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to 
Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 603–09 (1999)). 
72 Id.  
73 See id. at 43 (citation omitted). 
74 Id. (citation omitted). 
75 See Matt Marx et al., Noncompetes and Inventor Mobility: Specialists, Stars, and the 
Michigan Experiment 23 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Dep’t of Research, Working Paper No. 07-042, 
2007), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/07-042.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/372U-M5T3. The repealed Michigan statute’s language bore a striking 
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drastic drop in inventions and innovation within the business sector, whereas before 
the ban was lifted Detroit, Michigan was one of the United States’ most thriving 
business centers.76 The study noted: 
 
Constraining the flow of people and thus knowledge, enforcing regions 
may fail to develop entrepreneurial and technologically dynamic 
economies. Consistent with Gilson’s arguments, industry growth may be 
attenuated as startups fail to condense in enforcing regions. The networks 
of small companies so crucial to Silicon Valley’s growth would be less 
likely to develop in regions that enforce noncompetes.77 
 
California and Michigan are great examples of how the economy is bolstered 
by prohibiting postemployment noncompete agreements and likewise hindered by 
allowing them. California’s Silicon Valley is perhaps the technology hub of the 
entire United States. It appears that California’s ban on postemployment 
noncompete agreements has played a large role in Silicon Valley’s development. 
This is likely because prohibiting employers from enforcing noncompete 
agreements largely prevents a company from establishing a monopoly, and thus, 
increases competition. An increase in competition breeds innovation because the 
companies that do not continue to advance will be left behind. Innovation then yields 
more efficient processes, creates more jobs, and decreases prices. Finally, 
prohibiting postemployment noncompete agreements increases the mobility of the 
most talented labor, ensuring the longevity and prosperity of the business sector.  
 
B.  Employers May Utilize Other Legal Mechanisms to Protect Company Trade 
Secrets and Goodwill Without Harming Their Former Employees’ Future Job 
Prospects 
 
There are several purported reasons why employers use noncompete 
agreements, and employers may require them for any combination of the following 
reasons. One reason is to protect the company’s trade secrets from being divulged 
                                                 
resemblance to Section 16600, providing: “All agreements and contracts by which any 
person . . . agrees not to engage in any avocation [or] employment . . . are hereby declared to 
be against public policy and illegal and void.” MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.761 (West 
1967) (repealed 1985). Oddly enough, the Michigan Legislature inadvertently lifted the ban 
on noncompete agreements. See Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP 
Problem with Noncompetition Agreements, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 896 (2010). This 
occurred with the passing of the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act, which repealed the section 
of the code where Section 445.761 was found. Id. at 896 n.80. Surprisingly, “more than 
twenty pages of legislative analysis of [the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act] by both House 
and Senate subcommittees do not mention noncompetes as a motivation for the bill.” Marx 
et al., supra, at 7. Furthermore, it appears the Michigan Legislature did not even notice that 
it had abolished the noncompete provision. Moffat, supra, at 896 n.80.  
76 Marx et al., supra note 75, at 23. 
77 Id. (citations omitted). 
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by former employees.78 Another reason is to guard against losing current customers 
when an employee leaves to work for a competitor.79 There likely is a third reason, 
however, that motivates companies to require their employees to sign noncompete 
agreements—that reason is simply to ensure a company’s employees will not leave 
to work for a competitor.80 This creates unfair situations for employees discussed, 
infra, in section D.81 Simply put, to allow employers to restrict and diminish a former 
employee’s right to work is both unnecessary and poor public policy.  
Using confidentiality and nonsolicitation agreements, in lieu of noncompete 
agreements, would help companies achieve the two major goals that noncompete 
agreements purportedly set out to accomplish. In addition to achieving these goals, 
employing confidentiality and nonsolicitation agreements in the place of 
noncompete agreements eliminates the great potential harm to an employee who 
leaves his current employer for a better opportunity.  
A confidentiality agreement is “[a] promise not to disclose trade secrets or other 
proprietary information learned in the course of the parties’ relationship.” 82 
Confidentiality agreements provide all the protection an employer needs to guard its 
trade secrets, confidential customer lists, processes, procedures, etc. On the other 
hand, a nonsolicitation agreement is “[a] promise, usually in a contract for the sales 
of a business, a partnership agreement, or an employment contract, to refrain, for a 
specified time, from either (1) enticing employees to leave the company, or (2) trying 
to lure customers away.”83 Similar to confidentiality agreements, nonsolicitation 
agreements, like noncompete agreements, prevent a company’s former employee 
from stealing away its employees and customers.  
The question remains then, if a nonsolicitation agreement combined with a 
confidentiality agreement achieves the two major purported purposes of a 
noncompete agreement, why do companies use noncompete agreements at all? The 
easy answer is that employers use noncompete agreements to restrict employee 
mobility. Once the employee signs the noncompete agreement, she cannot leave 
without incurring a massive penalty, namely being restricted from working in her 
chosen field, or being forced to move to a new state, or country; transitioning to a 
new career altogether; going on unemployment; or if she competes, the risk of being 
sued.  
                                                 
78 See Blake, supra note 2, at 627. 
79 See id. 
80 See Moffat, supra note 75, at 894 (opining that noncompete agreements are “intended 
to restrict employee mobility”). 
81 See infra Part III(D). 
82 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 361. Confidentiality agreements are also 
commonly referred to as nondisclosure agreements. Id. Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“nondisclosure agreement” slightly differently: “A contract or contractual provision 
containing a person’s promise not to disclose any information shared by or discovered from 
a holder of confidential information, including all information about trade secrets, 
procedures, or other internal or proprietary matters.” Id. at 1215.  
83 Id. at 361. 
1212 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
It simply does not make sense to create vast amounts of collateral damage in 
the process of protecting one’s trade secrets, employees, and customers, especially 
not when those exact purposes can be achieved without any collateral damage.  
 
C.  Employers’ Noncompete Agreements, Even Where Unenforceable, Take 
Advantage of Employees’ Lack of Sophistication 
 
Although Utah courts have placed limitations on the enforceability of 
noncompete agreements, such as requiring reasonable territorial and duration 
restrictions, many employees who are bound by noncompete agreements will not be 
savvy enough or have the means to determine whether the noncompete agreement 
they signed is enforceable.  
A lawsuit filed in 2014 against popular sandwich shop Jimmy John’s 84 
illustrates just how pervasive overly restrictive noncompete agreements are between 
employers and lower-level employees, who are often taken advantage of due to their 
lack of sophistication.85 The noncompete provision in question attempted to restrict 
a terminated employee from working for any business that “derives . . . 10 percent 
of its revenue from sandwiches” and that is located within three miles of any Jimmy 
John’s location.86 Additionally, the duration of the noncompete agreement was two 
years.87 
                                                 
84  Dave Jamieson, Jimmy John’s Makes Low-Wage Workers Sign ‘Oppressive’ 
Noncompete Agreements, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2014, 4:03 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/13/jimmy-johns-non-compete_n_5978180.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/JQ9Q-25D9. 
85 Noncompete agreements are also harmful to sophisticated employees who have 
experience with them. See ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD 
LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 51 (2013). Noncompete agreements have 
become so prevalent that employees in many industries do not have a meaningful choice not 
to sign them. See id. (explaining that even sophisticated employees sign noncompete 
agreements because of the “leverage asymmetry” businesses possess). Many of these 
agreements are “presented as do or die at the beginning of the employment relationship.” Id. 
This would not matter much if noncompete agreements were not so prevalent, but they are; 
studies show that “nearly 90 percent of managerial and technical employees have signed 
them.” Id. Thus, people could not have a career in many industries without signing a 
noncompete agreement because they would be hard pressed to find a company that did not 
require it. 
86 Jamieson, supra note 84. 
87 Id. The exact language from the agreement provides:  
 
Employee covenants and agrees that, during his or her employment with the 
Employer and for a period of two (2) years after . . . he or she will not have any 
direct or indirect interest in or perform services for . . . any business which derives 
more than ten percent (10%) of its revenue from selling submarine, hero-type, 
deli-style, pita and/or wrapped or rolled sandwiches and which is located with 
[sic] three (3) miles of either [the Jimmy John’s location in question] or any such 
other Jimmy John’s Sandwich Shop.  
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Kathleen Chavez (“Ms. Chavez”), the counsel of record, reported that Jimmy 
John’s required both her clients to sign the noncompete agreement or they would not 
be hired.88  Stunningly, “the effective blackout area for a former Jimmy John’s 
worker would cover 6,000 square miles in 44 states and the District of Columbia.”89 
The restricted area under this noncompete agreement is so broad it would likely, if 
somehow found enforceable, prevent a former employee from working for nearly 
any sandwich shop in the country located within a metropolitan area or college town. 
According to an anonymous Jimmy John’s franchise owner, “the noncompete 
clause is part of a standard-issue hiring packet provided by corporate.”90 In a world 
where competitors copy one another on a frequent basis, Jimmy John’s is likely just 
one of a myriad of franchises that include similar noncompete provisions in its hiring 
packets.  
It is a moot point that Jimmy John’s noncompete agreement is almost certainly 
unenforceable in most jurisdictions, including Utah, based on the overly broad 
spatial restriction. First, only two former Jimmy John’s employees, out of thousands, 
who have signed the same provision, have challenged the noncompete agreement.91 
Hence, from an employer’s viewpoint, unenforceable noncompete agreements can 
be just as effective as enforceable agreements because former employees rarely 
challenge them in court.92 What’s more, the employer may not even care that the 
noncompete agreement is enforceable or perhaps intentionally designs it to be 
unreasonable. 93  Second, even if the noncompete agreement is found to be 
unenforceable due to the spatial restriction, most courts will trim the restriction down 
to what they determine to be a reasonable limitation and enforce the agreement under 
the new terms.94 Thus, the employee will remain restrained by the noncompete 
agreement.  
                                                 
 
Id. (alteration in original). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. Jimmy John’s reportedly has more than two thousand locations. Id. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. 
92 See Moffat, supra note 75, at 887–88; see also Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 
P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999) (“For every agreement that makes its way to court, many more 
do not.”); Richard P. Rita Pers. Servs. Int’l, Inc. v. Kot, 191 S.E.2d 79, 81 (Ga. 1972) (“For 
every covenant that finds its way to court, there are thousands which exercise an in terrorem 
effect on employees who respect their contractual obligations and on competitors who fear 
legal complications if they employ a covenantor, or who are anxious to maintain gentlemanly 
relations with their competitors.” (quoting Blake, supra note 2, at 682)). 
93 See Moffat, supra note 75, at 888 n.49 (“During my time in practice, I was asked by 
one client to draft a noncompete for all employees in a small company. I responded that the 
terms suggested by the client would be unenforceable. The client responded: ‘I don’t care. I 
just don’t want them to leave.’”). Moffat suggests that “employers have a tendency to 
overreach” when drafting their noncompete agreements, and this could be a widespread 
problem. See id. at 887–88. 
94 This process is known as reformation and also popularly referred to as the “blue 
pencil” doctrine. See, e.g., Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An 
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If the Utah Legislature bans postemployment noncompete agreements 
altogether, over time it would become common knowledge that these provisions are 
prohibited by law. As such, the general public would largely be freed from being 
duped into such harmful and unenforceable contracts. 
 
D.  Employees’ Rights and Interests Should Come First 
 
The United States is a place where the most treasured rights and interests are 
those of the people. Indeed, these rights are enshrined in the Bill of Rights.95 Yet 
Utah, by enforcing postemployment noncompete agreements, places the rights and 
interests of business entities before those of its employees. This is simply a case of 
the invented receiving more protection than the inventor.  
By contrast, California courts have declared that the interests of employees are 
“paramount to the competitive business interests of the employers.”96 In addition, 
California courts have shrewdly and repeatedly affirmed the right that people have 
to choose their own places of employment and that seeking any lawful employment 
is “one of the most cherished commercial rights we possess.”97 
There are many scenarios that demonstrate the unfairness that can occur when 
postemployment noncompete agreements are enforced or when the employee 
mistakenly complies with an unenforceable noncompete agreement. One common 
scenario occurs when an employee, who has chosen a particular career path, either 
becomes unhappy with her employer and wants to leave or is fired. The effect of the 
noncompete agreement is that when the employee is fired or otherwise leaves the 
company, she cannot immediately compete with her former employer. This person 
is often resigned to choose the lesser of three evils: (1) move or commute to another 
state or country that lies outside the geographic limit, potentially leaving the place 
where she laid down her roots, to pursue her selected occupation; (2) pursue a 
different occupation entirely, leaving behind her hard-earned experience and 
success; 98  or (3) simply seek unemployment, if possible, and wait for the 
                                                 
Argument for Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 673 (2008) 
(noting that the blue pencil doctrine allows courts “to either (1) strike unreasonable clauses 
from a noncompete agreement, leaving the rest to be enforced, or (2) actually modify the 
agreement to reflect the terms that the parties could have—and probably should have—
agreed to.”). This reformation process actually “increases the use of overly broad clauses” 
and encourages employers to require employees to enter into unenforceable noncompete 
agreements. Id. at 690–91. It should be noted that Utah is undecided in terms of whether it 
is permissible for a court to reform a noncompete provision. See BECK, supra note 6, at 12. 
95  See generally U.S. CONST. amends. I–X (providing guaranteed rights that are 
reserved for the people). 
96 Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). 
97 Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
98 A good example of this was noted by Matt Marx, a professor at MIT. See Matt Marx, 
Essays on Employee Non-compete Agreements (unpublished dissertation, executive 
summary, Harvard Business School), available at http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/ 
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noncompete time period to expire before returning to her field of expertise.99 All 
three of these options are unnecessary and pose an undue burden on the employee. 
For example, Leah Benene, a former Subway employee, started working at the 
sandwich shop when she was a teenager and evidently signed a noncompete 
agreement upon being made manager.100 After working for Subway for nearly five 
years, she was fired after asking for additional time off to recover from an illness 
and a resulting surgery.101 After being fired, Ms. Benene looked to put the skills she 
developed to good use and was hired at another sandwich shop nearby.102 When the 
Subway franchise found out about her new position, its attorney mailed a copy of 
the noncompete agreement she had signed. 103  The terms of the noncompete 
agreement stipulated that Ms. Benene could not work with a competing business 
located within one hundred miles of the Subway franchise for a full year following 
termination.104 In addition to sending her a copy of the noncompete agreement she 
                                                 
kauffman_org/emerging_scholars/kdfp_dissertations/2008/marx_matt.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/AKZ4-PLH7 (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). Through a study he conducted, 
Marx learned that a scientist, who earned a Ph.D. in speech recognition from a prestigious 
school, was let go from a company he cofounded. See id. Instead of looking for another job 
within his industry, the scientist left his field altogether because he did not want to risk 
breaching his noncompete agreement. Id. The scientist implied that he may not have been 
the only person to do the same. He said that  
 
employees were very much aware of these non-competition agreements. And 
many of them on a regular basis would . . . do a gut check and say, ‘Well, if I’m 
ever gonna leave and there’s gonna be two years when I’m not doing speech 
recognition, what would I do for two years?’ 
 
Id. 
99 David Neeleman, former executive at Southwest Airlines, former founder and CEO 
of JetBlue Airlines, and current CEO of Azul Brazilian Airlines, elected to wait out the five-
year term on his noncompete agreement with Southwest Airlines after he was dismissed from 
the company and before he founded JetBlue Airlines. See Marx et al., supra note 75, at 23–
24. Similarly, Vic Gundotra, former Microsoft executive and current Google executive, 
waited for his noncompete agreement to expire before taking his position at Google. See id. 
at 24. While taking the “unemployment” route worked for Mr. Neeleman and Mr. Gundotra, 
the average employee has nowhere near the amount of flexibility, resources, and future 
opportunities that is typical of corporate executives or other high-level employees. For most 
people, deciding to wait out the term of a noncompete agreement is impractical and likely 
the last resort.  
100  Amy Lange, Woman Looking for Work After Subway Enforces Non-compete 
Contract, FOX NEWS, (Oct. 29, 2013, 4:13 PM), (on file with the Utah Law Review). She 
was so young and inexperienced when she signed the noncompete agreement that she still 
does not remember ever having signed the document. Id. 
101 Id. 
102 See id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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signed, the attorney included a letter instructing her to honor the contract.105 The 
attorney also sent the same documents to Ms. Benene’s current employer and no 
doubt threatened to file a lawsuit against them as well. 106  Consequently, Ms. 
Benene’s current employer made the difficult decision to terminate her.107 
There was no need for Subway to require Ms. Benene to sign a noncompete 
agreement, much less threaten to enforce it. Subway was the party that ended the 
relationship. It is difficult to imagine a reasonable argument that would support an 
assertion that had Subway not enforced the noncompete agreement against Ms. 
Benene they would have been injured in some significant way. And while Subway 
has a legitimate interest in protecting its goodwill and trade secrets, it did not need 
a noncompete agreement to guard those interests; as discussed supra, in section B, 
Subway could have used a nonsolicitation and confidentiality agreement in place of 
the noncompete. 
A similarly common scenario occurs when a top-performing employee, who 
has neither received a promotion nor an increase in wage, is recruited by a 
competitor that resides within the geographic limit and offered a position that is 
superior in some way to her current position. The employer could prevent the 
employee from accepting the position through an injunction, or if the employee 
accepts the position, her employer could sue for damages.108 Consequently, like the 
person in the first scenario, the employee is resigned to choose the lesser of several 
evils. This is poor public policy; an employee should not be punished for excelling 
at her job.  
Another example exists when a founder of a company falls victim to her own 
company’s noncompete agreement. This may happen when the founder of a startup 
steps down as owner/CEO and hires a more experienced management team in an 
effort to take the company to the next level, all while remaining with the company 
in some lesser capacity. The new management would require the founder to sign a 
noncompete agreement in exchange for remaining with the company. The effect of 
the noncompete agreement is that, in the event the founder is let go, she cannot 
“compete” with the company she founded. This means she could not start another 
company or be hired by another company within the same industry or market for 
some six months to twenty-five years, unless that company competed outside of 
some judicially approved geographical area. Again, as in the previous two examples, 
the person is faced with a no-win situation. It is unjust to bar a founder of a company, 
who has been pushed out by new management, from competing with the very 
business she started. 
  
                                                 
105 Id. 
106 See id. 
107 Id. 
108 See TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros., 199 P.3d 929, 931–32 (Utah 2008). 
2015] POSTEMPLOYMENT NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS 1217 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, a decision by the Utah Legislature to follow California’s statutory 
scheme on noncompetition law would have a positive impact on the economy. A 
ban on all postemployment noncompete agreements would strengthen the economy 
by increasing innovation and healthy competition. Additionally, it would create a 
more fair and efficient labor market, allowing individuals to reach their employment 
potential. Finally, abolishing postemployment noncompete agreements would 
significantly increase the protection to employee rights without harming businesses’ 
rights to protect its goodwill and trade secrets. 
